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INTRODUCTION

In Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey the United States Supreme
Court resolved a longstanding conflict between the federal circuits.
The controversy stemmed from the federal circuits' varying interpretations of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C).2 The Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits directly conflicted with the other federal circuits as to the
admissibility of opinions and conclusions contained in official investigative reports.3 The other federal circuits considered such opinions and4
conclusions admissible as factual findings under certain circumstances.
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, however, did not admit such opinions
and conclusions under any circumstances.5

1. 109 S. Ct. 439 (1988).
2. Id. at 446. Rule 803(8)(C) provides,
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant
is available as a witness:...
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth ....

(C) in civil

actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual
findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by
law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness.
FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C).
3. See, e.g., Smith v. Ithaca Corp., 612 F.2d 215, 222 (5th Cir. 1980) (opinions and conclusions
not admissible); Melville v. American Home Assurance Co., 584 F.2d 1306, 1316 (3d Cir. 1978)
(opinions and conclusions from FAA airworthiness directives admissible); see also Bonner v.
City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1981) (newly established Eleventh Circuit
adopts present Fifth Circuit decisions). See generally Brooks, Evidence: Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C): Opinions and Conclusions Are In, and That's a Fact!, 28 BRIEFS, Aug. 1989,
at 4.
4. Rainey, 109 S. Ct. at 446; see also Perrin v. Anderson, 784 F.2d 1040, 1046-47 (10th
Cir. 1986); Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 724 F.2d 613, 618 (8th Cir. 1983).
5. Rainey, 109 S. Ct. at 446; Smith, 612 F.2d at 222.
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The Rainey Court was presented with a problem that many courts
face: resolving a dispute under conflicting precedent. Indeed, courts
face decisionmaking difficulties not only when they are confronted
with conflicting precedents but also when they are compelled to overrule the single "on point" precedent.6 In Rainey the Court resolved
the conflict between the circuits by interpreting legislative intent and
following the current trend to admit rather than exclude such evidence. 7 The Rainey decision raises the question as to what extent a
court may look beyond existing precedent to arrive at a decision without making its "judicial interpretation" s appear absurd.
This note suggests that courts can, and routinely do, look beyond
precedent in decisionmaking. In fact, courts do not bind themselves
by precedent to the extent as generally may be believed.9 When courts
depart from the applicable precedent in decisionmaking, "judicial interpretation" provides them the "leeways of choice" 10 to do so.
Courts frequently rely on extra-precedential sources of authority,
often labeled "secondary authority."'1 I use the term "secondary authority" to mean any source of authority other than case law, statutes,
and constitutions. Secondary authority actually can be "law" depending
on the manner in which a court relies on it.12
While not wholly ignored by the courts, 13 precedent cannot always
provide the basis for a court's decision. 14 Part II of this note illustrates

6. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (general federal common law does not displace
state common law in diversity cases), effectively overruled Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1
(1842) (general federal common law governs unless state has statutory law on point). Overruling
a one-hundred-year-old precedent significantly weakens the doctrine of stare decisis. See R.
FIELD, B. KAPLAN & K. CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCE-

DURE 205 (5th ed. 1984).
7. Rainey, 109 S. Ct. at 450.
8. Using the tool of "judicial interpretation" courts define how prior precedent will be
applied to instant facts. For an example of judicial interpretation in the context of statutory
construction, see Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950).
9. J. STONE, PRECEDENT AND LAW 34 (1985) ("Itlhe bindingness of precedent may be a
gross oversimplification").
10. Id. at 13. Professor Stone stated that judges almost always have some degree of choice.
Id. at 84.
11. For a discussion of the impact of secondary authority in the field of antitrust litigation,
see infra text accompanying notes 98-104.
12. Monahan, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and EstablishingSocial Science
in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 493 (1986).
13. See J. STONE, supra note 9, at 83.
14. Id. Professor Stone suggested that disregarding precedent in favor of "choicemaking"

is not the preferred method of arriving at a judicial decision; however, a lack of precedent often
forces courts to make choices. Id.
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the inadequacy of precedent in particular circumstances. Precedent is
most inadequate when applicable precedent does not exist. In that
instance, a court must make a decision by analogy or without precedential guidance altogether. 15 The most common ailment is conflicting
precedents,16 such as the conflict that existed in Rainey. Conflicting
precedents leave courts without absolute binding guidance. The court
7
may have to choose one precedent to the exclusion of another.
Another difficulty occurs when a court attempts to apply a seemingly
applicable precedent that the precedent court failed to explain. Without
the precedent court's ratio decidendi, a subsequent court only can
guess if the precedent court's reasoning applies to the subsequent
court's case.' s Finally, courts can and do overrule precedent when the
reasons to do so are more compelling than the reasons to adhere
blindly to stare decisis. 19
Precedent alone does not adequately serve judicial decisionmaking.
Although courts and commentators in the past have looked upon secondary authority with great disfavor, 20 modern courts are citing secondary authority with greater frequency in their opinions. 2' For example, in 1900 the Supreme Court cited secondary authority in only
24.1% of its cases.2 However, by 1978 Supreme Court citation of
secondary authority increased to 75.2% of all cases.23 Increased frequency of secondary authority citation increases the chances that
courts may use secondary authority as a primary basis for decision.2
In addition to citing secondary authority more frequently, the Supreme Court also has used secondary authority to overrule existing
precedent.2 Part III of this note will show that courts are relying on

15. See infra text accompanying notes 42-48.
16. J. STONE, supra note 9, at 63. The notion of conflicting precedents is consistent with
the inadequacy of precedent, or "complmentarities," described by Myres McDougal. .McDougal
described complementarities as instances in which precedents or rules come in pairs that are
directly opposed to each other. See infra text accompanying notes 49-54.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 49-58.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 59-72.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 73-82.
20. Lile, The Exaltation of Secondary Authority, 14 BENCH & BAR 53, 55 (1919) ('The
large majority of these volumes [of secondary authority] are but inaccurate and inexhaustive
digests.").
21. Daniels, Far Beyond the Law Reports: Secondary Source Citations in United States
Supreme Court Opinions: October Terms 1900, 1940, and 1978, 76 LAw LIBR. J. 1 (1983).
22. Id. at 5.

23.

Id.

24.
25.

Merryman, The Authority of Authority, 6 STAN. L. REv. 613, 616 (1954).
See infra text accompanying notes 98-104.
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secondary authority in varying degrees.26 In some cases secondary
authority has little or no influence.2 In other cases courts consider
secondary authority persuasive and sufficiently compelling to overrule
precedent.' A jurisprudential paradigm that is sophisticated enough
to explain the past and that provides a pragmatic model for increasing
the success of future prediction of judicial decisionmaking would be
helpful in this area.
The jurisprudential paradigms of natural law, positivism, and legal
realism are inadequate to explain courts' reliance on secondary authority in the judicial decisionmaking process. Part IV of this note briefly
examines these paradigms and their shortcomings.2 For example, despite the contributions of legal realism to discrediting precedent as
the sole basis for judicial decisionmaking, legal realism deconstructs
law without providing a replacement.3°
To replace the shortcomings of other jurisprudential paradigms,
part IV of this note suggests applying a jurisprudence that can explain
courts' reliance on secondary authority in the judicial decisionmaking
process. 3 1 In the early 1940s3 2 Professors Harold Lasswell and Myres
McDougal developed a configurative jurisprudence based on a policyoriented jurisprudential paradigm, which today is referred to as the
"New Haven School."' 3 In its simplest form the New Haven School
(NHS) examines law from an observer's standpoint and asks who says
what, through what channel, to whom, with what result, and with
what effects.3 This "communications theory,"w when expanded to a
complete paradigm, is sufficiently comprehensive to provide an
analysis of the impact and effect of secondary authority on the judicial
decisionmaking process.

26. See infra notes 83-109.
27. See Harrison, Trends and Traces: A Preliminary Evaluationof Economic Analysis
in Contract Law, 1988 ANNUAL SURVEY AM:. L. 73 (1988).
28. Id.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 113-28.
30. Byse, Fifty Years of Legal Education, 71 IoWA L. REV. 1063, 1075 n.19 (1986) ("[The
realists] led them into the Wilderness and left them there.").
31. See infra notes 129-207.
32. Byse, supra note 30, at 1075.
33. See L. CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW at Lx
(1989) ("New Haven School'" undoubtedly refers to the paradigm Lasswell and McDougal developed during their association with the Yale Law School in New Haven, Connecticut).
34. Nagan, Law and Post-ApartheidSouth Africa, 12 FORDHAMI INT'L L.J. 399, 417 (1989)
(citing Reisman, IternationalLawmaking: A Process of Communication, in Am[. Soc'Y OF
INT'L

L.:

PROCEEDINGS OF THE 75TH ANNUAL MEETING

101 (1981)).

35. Id. The process of the questions considered provides a basis for examining law as
communication, thus considering the type of interplay that only communication can describe. Id.
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THE INADEQUACY OF PRECEDENT AS THE SOLE BASIS OF
JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING

Prior to the first judicial mention of the word "precedent" in 1557,3
courts considered cases to be "merely illustrations of legal principles," 37
not binding authority. By the late nineteenth century courts began to
follow the doctrine of stare decisis, which required that the issuing
court or courts inferior to the issuing court be bound by prior decisions.9 Yet, even as the binding nature of precedent grew, stare
decisis never became absolute. By developing many exceptions to stare
decisis, courts failed to adhere to precedent and thus weakened the
very stability of law that the doctrine attempted to provide.39
Scholars have commented that a judge may make any decision and
find "an array of cases to support it."40 Additionally, the academic

community has noted a recent decline in adherence to precedent.41
This decline results from the inherent inadequacies of strict application
of precedent.
A. Instances in Which No PrecedentExists

A case of "first impression" requires a court to reach a decision
without the aid of precedent.4 A court in this instance does not follow
precedent, it creates it. In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,4 the Supreme

36. See H. BERMAN & W. GREINER, THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF LAW 492 (1966).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 493.
39. Hanna, The Role of Precedent in JudicialDecision, 2 VILL. L. REV. 367 (1957). Hanna
summarized the American approach to stare decisis:
The general American doctrine [of stare decisis] as applied to courts of last resort
is that a court is not inexorably bound by its own precedents but will follow the
rules of law which it has established in earlier cases, unless clearly convinced that
the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by departing from precedent.
Id. at 368.
40. 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE at xv (2d ed. 1923) ("A judge may decide almost any question
any way, and still be supported by an array of cases."). Justice Jackson stated, "I know that in
this great mass of opinions by men of different temperaments and qualifications and viewpoints,
writing at different times and under varying local influences, some printed judicial word may
be found to support almost any plausible proposition." Jackson, Decisional Law and Stare
Decisis, 30 A.B.A. J. 334 (1944); see also Merryman, supra note 24, at 619.
41. Landes & Posner, Legal Precedent:A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. &
ECON. 249, 293 (1976).

42. A case of "first impression" is one that presents a court a novel question of law, as yet
undecided. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 572 (5th ed. 1979).
43. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
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Court considered whether an indirect purchaser has standing to sue
for antitrust violations under section four of the Clayton Act.- No
precedent for this decision existed.4 5 In creating precedent, the Court
46
relied on its previous denial of the "pass on theory." In a prior case
the Court had held that an antitrust defendant could not argue that
a direct purchaser plaintiff was not injured simply because the plaintiff
had "passed on" its increased costs to its consumers. 47 Having previously rejected this defensive use of the "pass on theory," the court
in Illinois Brick also refused to allow the offensive use of the "pass
on theory" and denied standing to the indirect purchaser plaintiffs.4
Although guided by the equities and economic considerations of
analogous precedent, the Illinois Brick Court nevertheless reached
an unprecedented decision. When precedent is nonexistent, as in Illinois Brick, courts cannot rely on stare decisis to provide an answer
to all judicial decisionmaking questions. Under these circumstances,
a court must use other sources of authority for its decisionmaking.
B.

Conflicting Precedents: "Complementarities"

A court also must use other sources of authority when two or more
competing precedents exists. Competing, or conflicting, precedents
exist in many areas of the law. Professor McDougal termed these
paired opposites "complementarities. 49 For example, pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be honored) is a complementarity of rebus
sic stantibus (but not if conditions change) 0 Similarly, one can use
force in self-defense, but not unless the use of such force is reasonably
necessary.5 ' "Freedom of the seas" is a complementarity of "contiguous
zones. ' '1 2 The Court in Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey,M confronted

44.

Id. at 726.

45. Id.
46. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
47. See id. at 488-89.
48. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 735. The Court held by analogy that, since a defensive use
of the "pass on" theory was unavailable to a defendant, plaintiff's attempted offensive use also was

unavailable. Id.
49. McDougal, Law as a Processof Decision: A Policy Oriented Approach to Legal Study,
1 NATURAL L. FORUM 53, 61 (1956).
50. See Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568, 572, 33 N.W. 919, 923 (1887) (parties to an
agreement '"may avoid [the contract] ... upon the mistake of a material fact").
51. Fraguglia v. Sala, 17 Cal. App. 2d 738, 62 P.2d 783 (Ct. App. 1936).
52. M. McDoUGAL & M. REISIAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEM PORARY PERSPECTIVE 586 (1981). For other examples of "complementarities," see McDougal, supra note 49, at
61-62.
53. 109 S. Ct. 439 (1988).
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complementarities in precedent. Before Rainey, "opinions and conclusions could be admitted into evidence" was the paired opposite of
"opinions and conclusions could not be so admitted." Which paired
opposite applied depended upon which federal circuit heard the controversy.
When a court must decide between competing precedents, it can
disguise choice by utilizing, as in Rainey, the interpretative function.It cannot, however, escape choice. 6 When two competing applicable
precedents exist, precedent is not determinative. Therefore, the court
does not reach its decision by a "mechanical jurisprudence"' 7 because
the court must decide which precedent applies. Inevitably, the decision
will determine "whose ox is going to be gored."5 When a court decides
which of the competing precedents it will choose, the court utilizes a
decisionmaking process that includes sources of authority other than
precedent.
C.

Unexplained Precedents

Another example of the inadequacy of precedent emerges when a
court must decide if the precedent court's reasoning, or ratio decidendi, makes the precedent applicable to the present court's issue. 9

54. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
55. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
56. L. CHEN, supra note 33, at 12 ('Decisions (choices) cannot be made by neutral decisionmakers (neutral human beings) neutrally applying neutral rules that are neutrally derived. Rules
simply do not decide cases, people decide, and rules may provide only minimal guidance in
decisionmaking.").
57. Dean Roscoe Pound characterized '"mechanical jurisprudence" as a system which denigrates into technicality, in which principles are no longer used to make rules fit cases, and in
which decisions are made by "the purely mechanical task of counting and determining the
numerical preponderance of authority." Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence,8 COLUM. L. REV.
605, 607 (1908).
58. The author borrows this phrase from Professor Winston P. Nagan, professor of law at
the University of Florida College of Law, who used the phrase on numerable occasions to
describe the basis of judicial decisionmaking, the courts must decide which conflicting interest
is more compelling and should prevail. Professor Liicke adopted Heck's more formal statement
of the maxim:
[The] fundamental truth from which we must proceed is that each command of the
law determines a conflict of interests; it originates from a struggle between opposing
interests, and represents as it were the resultant of the opposing forces. It operates
in a world full of competing interests, and, therefore, always works at the expense
of some interests."
Liicke, The Common Law: JudicialImpartialityand Judge-Made Law, 98 L.Q. REV. 29, 50-51
(1982).
59. J. STONE, supra note 9, at 123
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Each of the two widely accepted methods of determining the ratio
decidendi of a case creates potential leeway for courts.0 The first
method seeks to establish the reason for the holding based on the
"material facts. '' 61 Under this method a court determines the rationale
of the precedent opinion from facts "material" to the circumstances
that make the former decision applicable.2 The second method is the
"rule-propounded" method. Under the "rule-propounded" method, a
subsequent court relies on the precedent court's expressly stated
rationale for its holding.6
The "material facts" method is inadequate when the precedent
opinion fails to assert which facts are indeed "material." In Barnett
Bank v. Hooper,64 the Florida Supreme Court ruled that a fiduciary
relationship can exist in the borrower-lender relationship of the banking industry.6 While the court provided many facts that indicated the
bank had engaged in fraudulent activities and thus justified the court's
imposition of a fiduciary relationship between the bank and the borrower,6 the court stated that the relationship also could be established
under other "special circumstances. ' ' 67 The court failed, however, to
provide the factual bases that would be sufficient to establish these
"special circumstances." ' The Barnett decision provides precedent
when fraud is at issue, but the decision has little precedential value
in other cases because the court failed to explain which facts in Barnett
created "special circumstances."
The infamous doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher,69 which established
the strict-liability dangerous instrumentality rule, 70 illustrates how the
"rule-propounded" method also is inadequate. As Professor Roscoe
Pound noted, the Rylands court provided a rule that courts often
have held inapplicable because of their "manifest inclination to discover

60. Id. For a thorough discussion of determining the ratio decidendi of a case, see Goodhart,
Detenniningthe Ratio Decidendiof a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161 (1930), reprintedin A. GOODHART,
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE (1931).
61. J. STONE, Supra note 9, at 123.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 124.
Id.
498 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1986).
Id. at 926.
Id. at 924.
Id. at 925-26.

68.

Id.

69. 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868).
70. See R. POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 110 (1923) (doctrine is "that
one who maintains something which if not kept in hand may endanger the general security,
must keep it in hand at the risk of responding for resulting injuries if he does not").
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something in the facts [of Rylands] which [takes] the case out of the
rule. '71 Although the Rylands court expressly provided reasoning for
its rule, other courts have avoided its precedent by distinguishing the
case on factual grounds. 72
Comparing the two methods discloses their similarity. In both
methods the applicability of the precedent court's reasoning rests with
the instant court's discretion regarding the factual similarity of the
two cases. If a court determines that the precedent court's reasoning
or lack of reasoning does not coincide with the instant facts, the court
can consider extra-precedential factors. In short, courts are guided
by ratio decidendi to the extent that, in their discretion, they deem
themselves bound. All precedent is thus "unexplained" when courts
feel a departure is warranted by considerations from other sources.
D.

Overruled Precedents

Precedent is most vitiated when a court expressly overrules it.
When a court overrules precedent, the court must use extra-precedential sources of authority. Logically, the existing precedent cannot be
the court's guide because the court is abandoning it. Because the court
is overruling precedent, it cannot use precedent as the sole basis for
judicial decisionmaking.7
Precedent also is inadequate when lower courts do not consider
4 For example, in McCray v. Abrams,75 a
themselves bound by it.7

71. Id. at 36.
72. See, e.g., Reynolds v. W.H. Hinman Co., 145 Me. 343, 75 A.2d 802 (1950); Gulf Pipe
Line Co. v. Sims, 168 Okla. 209, 32 P.2d 902 (1934).
73. Even when courts do not expressly overrule a precedent, the effect can be the same
in instances in which 'Judges who dislike a precedent.., avoid it by inventing subtle distinctions." LUicke, supra note 58, at 71. Holmes noted the absurdity of courts strictly following
stare decisis precedent:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon
which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from
blind imitation of the past.
O.W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 187 (1923).
Yet, some courts have been painfully forthright in overruling a prior decision. In Alferitz
v. Borgwardt, 126 Cal. 201, 58 P. 460 (1899), while overruling its prior decision, the court
stated that "one of its earlier decisions was so bad that a lawyer who relied on it in advising
a client would demonstrate his incompetence." Id. at 208, 58 P. at 462; see also Merryman,
supra note 24, at 620-21 n.12.
74. See generally Bratz, Stare Decisis in Lower Courts: Predictingthe Demise of Supreme
Court Precedent, 60 WASH. L. REV. 87 (1984).
75. 576 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), affd in part, vacated in part, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d
Cir. 1988).
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federal district court repudiated an eighteen-year-old United States
Supreme Court decision by holding that racially motivated peremptory
challenges offend the equal protection clause. 76 McCray contradicted
Swain v. Alabama,77 in which the Supreme Court had held that such
a practice was not violative of the United States Constitution. 7s
McCray illustrates how extra-precedential sources of authority can
affect courts. Although the McCray court could have overruled itself
as a matter of policy, 9 as a lower court it was bound to "apply the
law as last pronounced by superior judicial authority."8 0
Recognizing the necessity of overruling precedent, Holmes stated
that "[t]he life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience." 81
Courts do not rely solely on precedent or logical deduction from precedent in their decisionmaking; they also use reason from legal and
extra-legal sources. 2 Thus, in certain circumstances, precedent is inadequate to provide the sole basis for judicial decisionmaking. Often,
the void left by this inadequacy can be filled by secondary authority.

III.

THE ROLE OF SECONDARY AUTHORITY IN THE
JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Courts have viewed secondary authority, particularly law reviews,
as "authoritative" for over a half-century.8 Judge Learned Hand asserted that lawyers should use law reviews in their briefs, and courts
should cite them in their opinions. 2 Justice Cardozo also acclaimed
76. Id. at 1249.
77. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
78. Id. at 221.
79. See Bratz, supra note 74, at 90 ("the Court [has] stated that stare decisis promoted
the policies of (1) certainty in the law's application, (2) fairness and efficiency in the administration
of justice, and (3) maintenance of public confidence in judges as impersonal decisionmakers")
(construing Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970) (footnotes omitted).
When none of the policies are threatened significantly, the Court may overrule precedent. Id.
at 90-91.
80. Kelman, The Force of Precedent in the Lower Courts, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 3, 4 (1967).
But see Green, The Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to Which it
Should Be Applied, 40 ILL. L. REV. 303, 319 n.73 (1946) (i the [lower court] is convinced
that the former decision should be reconsidered [it] may refuse to follow it so as to give the
appellate court the opportunity to reconsider"), cited in Bratz, supra note 74, at 91 n.18.
81.

O.W.

HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).

82. J. STONE, supra note 9, at 98-99.
83. Maggs, Concerningthe Extent to Which the Law Review Contributesto the Development
of the Law, 3 S.CAL. L. REV. 181, 187 (1930) (the authoritativeness of law reviews has been
recognized to a "sight but increasing extent").
84. Id. at 186. Judge Hand stated,
Much important discussion appears in the law journals, which may be of great
assistance to judges in making any comprehensive examination, especially such as
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the utility of law reviews in helping him perform his judicial duties.In addition, Justice Cardozo believed that the increase of the courts'
reliance on law reviews reflected a shift in the leadership of legal
thought from the judicial bench to the professors' chairs . 6 Moreover,
although most secondary authority citations are to law reviews, law
reviews are but one form of secondary authority upon which courts
increasingly have relied. However, courts did not always rely so heavily on secondary authority.
A.

The Historical Disfavor of the Use of Secondary Authority

In the early 1900s many of the bench and bar believed that judicial
decisions were the "sole authoritative evidences of the unwritten
law." 8 They viewed secondary authority as a "short-cut" to the law,
arrived at by vocation rather than as a result of the serious practitioner
eking out a livelihoodA5 Moreover, they believed that secondary authority authors lacked a "love of the law, '" which only practitioners
could possess, and were motivated solely by compensation.90 Secondary
authority was indeed "secondary" and lacked the integrity and authoritativeness of primary authority.
B.

The Emergence of Secondary Authority

As the early obstacles to the use of secondary authority eroded
over time, the decisionmaking value of secondary authority increased.
is out of the ordinary field of their researches. It is certainly most desirable that
counsel should refer to them in their briefs, and I do not see why credit should
not be given where credit is due, when judges come to write their opinions.
Id. at n.lla (quoting Judge Hand's Letter to the Editor).
85. Id. (Cardozo "found law review articles of conspicuous utility in the performance of
[his] judicial duties. This being so, [he was] unwilling to appropriate the learning of the authors
of the articles without making due acknowledgement.") (quoting Chief Judge Cardozo's Letter
to the Editor).
86. Douglas, Law Review and Full Disclosure, 40 WASH. L. REV. 227 (1965) (citing Cardozo, in SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS at ix (1931); see also Rheinstein,
Law Faculties and Law Schools: A Comparison of Legal Education in the United States and
Germany, 1938 Wis. L. REV. 5, 7 (In the sixth century faculties of law formally attained
positions as the "ultimate" appellate court. In that sense, scholarly writings had the impact of
precedent.).
87. See Lile, supra note 20, at 53.
88. Id. at 54 (secondary authority "is to the lawyer what translation of the classics are
to the student").
89. Id.
90. Id. at 56; see also Douglas, supra note 86, at 228-29. Justice Douglas suggested law
review authors are not always neutral evaluators. Sometimes they are not mere scholars because
they have "axes to grind" or have financial outcomes at stake. These outside influences bias a
seemingly neutral article. Id.
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Even early critics acknowledged that exceptions existed to the inferiority of secondary authority.91 Similar to the hierarchy of courts, courts
and commentators regarded particular authors of secondary authority
as more authoritative than others.9
Today, periodicals and authors both are quantitatively and qualitatively ranked as to influence and impact.Y Frequency of citation, although inconclusive, is an effective tool for assessing the value of
secondary authority because increased frequency of citation itself gives
a work authority.Y However, the frequency of citation is limited as a
gauge for assessing the value of secondary authority because it does

not measure qualitative factors.
If increased frequency of citation is sufficiently indicative of the
growing influence of secondary authority, the numbers are striking.
From 1900 to 1978, the United States Supreme Court's use of secondary authority increased 625%. 5 During the same period secondary
authority citation per case increased 1,635%.9 Remarkably, the secondary authority citation of nonlegal sources rose 1,429%.9

91. Lile, supra note 20, at 56.
92. Id. at 54. Among the class that Lile considered more authoritative were the following.
Blackstone, Kent, Story, Greenleaf, Bishop, Pomeroy, Cooley, and Minor. Lile considered the
authority of these authors and a few others equal to primary authority. Id.
93. Harrison, supra note 27 (listing works by particular authors whose influence on judicial
decisionmaking ranges from being noted in a string cite to significantly influencing judicial
opinions); Maru, Measuring the Impact of Legal Periodicals,1976 Ams. B. FOUND. RES. J. 227
(ranking periodicals based on frequency of citation).
94. Daniels, supra note 21, at 27; Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations:An Empirical
Study of the CitationPractice of the CaliforniaSupreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S.
CAL. L. REV. 381, 413 (1977) ("the repeated citation of [secondary authority] has some effect
on the way law grows"). Even though secondary authority is cited most frequently for convenience, a court, in recognizing secondary authority, gives the particular work credibility. Future
courts will then look to this authority. It thus exerts some influence on the way the law grbws.
Id.; see also Maru, supra note 93, at 230 (because it is objective, counting the frequency of
citation is the best way to determine the impact of secondary authority).
95. Daniels, supra note 21, at 4 (legal citations to secondary authority rose "from 127 in
the 1900 term to 921 in 1978").
96. Id. (citation of secondary authority rose "from 0.651 to 7.140 per case").
97. Id. (citation of nonlegal secondary authority rose "from 17 in 1900 to 260 in 1978").
Although the numbers for United States Supreme Court citation of secondary authority in 1988
are not as great as those of 1978, they are, nevertheless, impressive. I conducted my own study
of United States Supreme Court citation of secondary authority for cases decided in the year
1988. I excluded all primary sources, including the following: constitutions, statutes, court decisions, court rules, administrative regulations and adjudications, executive orders, and attorneys'
general opinions. I counted only published sources. In examining the citing cases, I studied only
actual cases; therefore, memorandum decisions (e.g., cases granting or denying certiorari) are
not included in this study.
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Decisions in Which Secondary Authority Has Influenced
the Judicial Decisionmaking Process

The qualitative degree of influence is more difficult to ascertain.
Whether competing authorities influenced a court to make one decision
at the expense of another may not be reflected conclusively within
the text of an opinion. Yet, some decisions inescapably demonstrate
that secondary authority was influential in the judicial decisionmaking

process. Antitrust litigation since 1977 is an area of law in which
secondary authority has influenced courts.
ContinentalT.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.9 was a sharp depar-

ture from antitrust precedent." In Sylvania the United States Supreme Court overruled United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. 1°0

and held that nonprice vertical restraints were no longer per se antitrust violations.1 1 In overruling Schwinn, the Court dramatically

changed antitrust law and abandoned a rule that had suffered ten
years of "nearly uniform scholarly condenmation."'' The Court noted
that the "great weight of scholarly opinion [had] been critical of
[Schwinn]."1°3 While the impact of secondary authority upon the Court
1988 Secondary Authority Citation

Number of
Cases
Counted
158

Maj. Opinion
54

Number of
citations
Conc. Opinion
13

Cases with at least one citation to secondary authority:
Majority opinions with at least one citation to secondary authority:

Dissent
25
46.8%
34.1%

Secondary authority has affected the outcome of Supreme Court decisions. For example, in
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985), the Court confronted the question of whether a mobile
home was more like a car or a home. Writing for the dissent, Justice Stevens cited three
nonlegal publications, TRAILER LIFE, MOTOR HOME, and RV LIFESTYLE MAGAZINE, from

which he reasoned, "I believe that society is prepared to recognize that the expectations of
privacy within a [motor home] are not unlike the expectations one has in a fixed dwelling." Id.
at 399-402 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Collier, Precedent and Legal Authority: A Critical
History, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 771, 803-805 n.143 (citing Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985)).
98. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
99. Cf. Note, Whether to Overrule Statutory Based Civil Rights Precedent: Whose Needs
Should Prevail?, 41 FLA. L. REV. 369, 378 n.54 (1989) (overruled precedent had been the
"subject of judicial and scholarly controversy.").
100. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
101. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 59.
102. E. SULLIVAN & J. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC
IMPLICATIONS 155, 169 (1988).
103. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 47 n.13. The Court cited the following legal periodicals: Baker,
Vertical Restraints in Times of Change: From White to Schwinn to Where?, 44 ANTITRUST
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cannot be determined with absolute certainty, "judicial cognizance"1
of the cited sources appears to have been influential.
Secondary authority has influenced decisions in other areas of the
law. For example, scholarly commentary concerning "law and
economics" has been persuasive in many contracts cases. 1 5 Richard
Posner's economic theories have influenced judicial decisionmaldng in
contracts cases in which economic analysis and theory are relevant. 06
Significantly, most consider contracts law to be a well-settled area of
the law. 107 That secondary authority is capable of influencing this wellsettled area is evidence of the significance courts attribute to secondary
authority. When secondary authority influences opinions, it plays a
role in the "total legal process which is not greatly different from that
played by primary materials."10

L.J. 537 (1975); Handier, The Twentieth Annual Antitrust Review - 1967, 53 VA. L. REV.
1667 (1967); Louis, Vertical DistributionalRestraints Under Schwinn and Sylvania: An Argument for the Continuing Use of a PartialPer Se Approach, 75 MICH. L. REV. 275 (1976);
McLaren, Territorialand Customer Restrictions, Consignments, Suggested Retail Prices and
Refusals to Deal, 37 ANTITRUST L.J. 137 (1968); Pollock, Alternative Distribution Methods
After Schwinn, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 595 (1968); Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court:
An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution,Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLIUI. L. REV. 282 (1975); Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments: 1974, 75
COLU. L. REV. 243 (1975); Zimmerman, DistributionRestrictions After Sealy and Schwinn,
12 ANTITRUST BULL. 1181 (1967); Note, Vertical Territorialand Customer Restrictions in the
FranchisingIndustry, 10 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 497 (1974); Note, Territorialand Customer Restrictions:A Trend Toward a BroaderRule of Reason?, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 123
(1971); Note, TerritorialRestrictions and Per Se Rules - A Re-evaluation of the Schwinn and
Sealy Doctrines, 70 MICH. L. REV. 616 (1972). See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 47-48.
104. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). In Muller then attorney Louis Brandeis
wrote an influential brief consisting of social science materials. The Court responded that although
the social science materials '"may not be, technically speaking, authorities," they would nonetheless receive judicial recognition. Id. at 420-21. Any brief which cites extensively to 'the domain
of social science" is known as a "Brandeis Brief." Klein, PC's:A Revolution in the Practice of
Law, 14 LEGAL ECON. 44 (1988); see also Monahan & Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining,
Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (1986).
105. See generally Harrison, supra note 27.
106. See id. at 111-12. Professor Harrison considered R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF THE LAW (3d ed. 1986) to have influenced the judicial opinions of the following cases: A &
S Transp. Co. v. Tug Fajardo, 688 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1982); Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho
37, 48, 740 P.2d 1022, 1033 (1987); George v. Veach, 67 N.C. App. 674, 680, 313 S.E.2d 920,
924 (1984); Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168, 173 (Tex. 1987) (Gonzalez, J.,
dissenting). Harrison, supra note 27, at 111-12.
107. Harrison, supra note 27, at 79. Professor Harrison suggested that scholar's theories
may more frequently support established rules. Significantly, the influence these theories exert
on established rules is more difficult to detect than when theories are used to support "dramatic
change" in the law. Id.
108. Merryman, supranote 24, at 620. Professor Merryman compared the roles that primary
and secondary authority play in practice:
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The role and influence of secondary authority are dependant upon
many factors. The author's views must be recognized as being authoritative. The author's analysis must contain good reasoning and be
helpful to his or her audience. The secondary authority itself must be
authoritative. Finally, the court considering the proffered secondary
authority must be receptive to secondary authority in general. Using
the "New Haven School" (NHS), these factors translate comfortably:
who (author) says what (scholarly commentary) through what channel
(publication) to whom (the court) with what result and effects (the
influence observed). 1 9 Indeed, judicial decisionmaking is hydraulic in
the sense that a change in one element of a decision affects other
elements either directly or indirectly. A jurisprudential paradigm, to
be descriptive as well as prescriptive, must be as hydraulic as the
judicial decisionmaking process it examines.
IV.

THE JURISPRUDENTIAL EXPLANATION OF INCREASED
SECONDARY AUTHORITY CITATION:
THE "NEw HAVEN SCHOOL"

Since the time of Socrates, jurisprudence students and scholars
have challenged each others' theories about law and justice.llo Today,
disagreement still exists concerning which is the "correct" school of
jurisprudential thought.", NHS is the most appropriate school for
analyzing the impact of secondary authority on the judicial decisionmaking process. Unlike other schools, NHS comprehensively addresses
the notion that judges are not neutral in their relation to society.
Any jurisprudential school attempting to explain the judicial decisionmaking process must consider the communication of social values,
which often are communicated by secondary authority. Communicating
social values permits judges to be both socially responsive and socially

This difference is supposed to be sufficiently great to justify classification of secondary authority in such a way as to suggest that is clearly inferior as "law" to statutes
and cases. It is obvious, however, that given the judicial practice of citing secondary
authorities in opinions these works can and do play a part in the total legal process
which is not greatly different from that played by primary materials. It is possible
for cases to be decided, rules of law to be stated, lines of decisions begun and
perpetuated, solely on the authority of textual treatment having its origins outside
the judicial or legislative process.
Id.
109. See Nagan, supra note 34.
110. See Kaye, The Logic and Antilogic of Secret Rights, 72 MINN. L. REv. 603, 603 (1988).
111. Mabe, Toward a Critical Theory of the Role of Values in Judicial Decision Making:
Dworkin and Recent Theories of Adjudication, 18 MEM. ST. U.L. REv. 25, 25-26 (1987).
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responsible. "1 Jurisprudential schools other than NHS are too narrow
because they fail to consider communication of social values of secondary authority. They also lack the identification and application of intellectual tasks necessary for inquiry. This note briefly will explore the
inadequacies of other jurisprudential schools.
A.

The Inadequacy of Other JurisprudentialParadigms

Jurisprudential schools employing theological or metaphysical "first
principles" as their basis suffer from easily recognized shortcomings
in explaining the emergence of secondary authority. For example, if
the proper task of the "natural law" jurist is to "put God's plan into
practice,"1 3 only the Bible or other theological literature would be

appropriate secondary authority. Paradoxically, for the natural law
jurist, the "word of God" is not secondary authority at all, rather it
is the sole primary authority.14 Occasionally, courts do cite the Bible
and other religious texts. 115 However, because courts rarely cite them,
the natural law school cannot explain the increased citation of sources
the school considers invalid.
Analytical jurisprudence, or positivism, requires that "law be the
1 According to the positivist school, coercommand of the sovereign.""'
cion is an essential element of law, and government enforces obedience
to the law through fear of sanction." 7 At this point the positivist school

112. MacGuigan, Sources of JudicialDecisionMaking andJudicialActivism, in EQUALITY
& JUDICIAL NEUTRALITY 35 (1987). MacGuigan stated that judges
must be socially responsive, or, as many would say, activist, in doing their best
to bring the law into conformity with social needs. But on the other hand, they
must also be socially responsible, that is, they must anchor their justifications for
change in the law in social reality. They must never look within themselves alone
for social values but must always relate them to society.
Id. (emphasis in original); see also Gold, A PrincipledApproach to Equality Rights: A Preliminary Inquiry, 4 S.C.L. REV. 131 (1982).
113. Lasswell & McDougal, Jurisprudencein Policy-OrientedPerspective, 19 U. FLA. L.
REV. 486, 493 (1967). Many variations of "natural law" exist which, for the brief discussion
within this note, have been excluded. Id. at 494 n.6. For example, the "sociological natural law"
model, which focuses on social values, considers law as an "ongoing, interactive process, not a
finished product." Note, supra note 99, at 381-82; see also D. Amato, Lon Fullerand Substantive
Natural Law, 26 Am. J. JURIS. 202, 212 n.34 (1981).
114. See M. REISMAN & A. SCHREIBER, JURISPRUDENCE 174-75 (1987).
115. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 109 S. Ct. 3086,
3093-94 (1989) (citing Luke 2:1-21; Matthew 2:1-11).
116. E. POLLACK, JURISPRUDENCE, PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS 521 (1979).
117. Id. at 553.
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fails. Obedience to law often is the result of moral and religious motives

and not fear of sanction. 118
More pertinent to this note is how the influence of secondary authority fits into the calculus of the positivist school. For example, if
Kelsen's "pure theory" of positivism dictates that law is what the law
has "actually laid down, [and] not what it ought to be,"11 9 a court could

not consider secondary authority that advocated striking down a law
or overruling precedent. 2 0 Similarly, although Professor Hart's "rule
of recognition" provides a consideration of "social facts, ' 12 his model
does not explain why and under what circumstances secondary authority will have an effect on the judicial decisionmaking process. 2 2 The
the ability of secondbasic flaw of positivism is that it fails to consider
123
ary authority to communicate societal change.
Responding to natural law and positivism, legal realism was virtually antithetical to the precepts of both. The legal realists' skepticism
of judges neutrally and mechanically applying the law directly contradicted prior jurisprudential thought. 12 To the realists, the "Harvard-Langdellian" doctrinal approach to law was invalid because law
is '"too filled with conflict . . . leaves too much open . . [with] too
much to be decided" for it to control completely." 5 Because the realists
made direct attacks on the doctrinal approach to law, many scholars
viewed realism in a negative, iconoclastic light." 6
118. Id. Pollack surmised that people obey laws because of moral and religious motives,
not simply out of fear of sanction. See id.
119. R. DIAS, JURISPRUDENCE 358 (5th ed. 1985).
120. See id. at 359 (Kelsen required that a theory of law be free from ethics, politics, and

sociology).
121. See id. at 355.
122. Id. Dworkin provided an additional criticism of the rule of recognition. He noted that
"what the law is has to be determined with reference to doctrines, standards and principles,
which do not derive their law-quality from a rule of recognition." Id. at 354-55.
123. See E. POLLACK,supra note 116, at 561 ("law cannot be dissociated from life, which
gives it content and purpose."); see also L. FULLER, LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 77-78 (1940);
W. SEAGLE, THE HISTORY OF LAW at x (1946); Brown, Legal Research: The ResourceBase and
TraditionalApproaches, 7 Am. BEHAV. Sci. 3, 6 (1963).
124. See Byse, supra note 30, at 1072-73; see also Vetter, Postwar Legal Scholarship on
Judicial Decision Making, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 412, 412 (1983) (legal realism questions the
positivist view that precedents, statutes, and constitutional provisions can produce reliable
outcomes in litigated cases).
125. Kronman, JurisprudentialResponses to Legal Realism, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 335,
335 (1988); see also Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism - Responding to Dean Pound,
44 HARv.L. REV. 1222, 1233-38 (1931).
126. Kronman, supra note 125, at 335. Skeptics can be divided into two groups: rule skeptics,
who attribute legal uncertainty to the "paper" rules of law, and fact skeptics, who attribute
legal uncertainty to the elusiveness of facts used to decide a case. LLOYD OF HAM1PSTEAD,
INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 456 (4th ed. 1979).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol41/iss5/3

18

OF SECONDARY
AUTHORITY
Brooks:EMERGENCE
Jurisprudence:
The "New Haven
School" and Emergence 1049
of Secondary

Today, legal realism has few followers. Although successful in deconstructing prior theories about what law is, the realists failed to
provide a new theory to replace those they destroyed. 12 Thus, legal
realism failed to provide a model for evaluating the influence of secondary authority on the judicial decisionmaking process. Legal realism,
however, provided the basis for new theories that considered judges
human and "responsive to the variables which typically shape the
'1
conduct of all [persons].
B.

The Configurative or Policy-OrientedJurisprudentialParadigm:
A Map for Decision

A jurisprudential school attempting to explain the effect of secondary authority on the judicial decisionmaking process must provide a
theory of problem solving in the context of community decisionmaking. 12 In this sense, "community" means any socioeconomic, political
group in which finite, cherished values are allocated. A policy-oriented
approach to jurisprudence that adds the community context into its
decisionmaking must have three bases: (1) contextual; (2) problem
solving; and (3) multimethod. 130 These three major bases form the
foundation of the NHS jurisprudential paradigm.

127. E. POLLACK, supra note 116, at 788 ("American legal realism reached the zenith of
its popularity in the first half of the twentieth century. Its supporters included many of the
leaders in legal education, the judiciary, and the bar. This popularity, however, declined rapidly,
and today the theory is without important representation.").
128. Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 113, at 495. The legal realist theory of scientific
investigation was inadequate because science is "value free." Judicial decisionmaking, however,
requires policy decisions that include value-oriented input. Id. Professors Lasswell and McDougal
stated,
[L]egal realist did little service to "science" and scarcely more to law by merely
proclaiming the virtues of scientific modes of thought and investigation. It is a
disservice to science to exaggerate the contribution which science alone can make
to the policy questions that are the distinctive problems by which lawyers are
confronted.
Id. The underlying tenet of the New Haven School is that the decisionmaldng process, judicial
or otherwise, demands the maximization of goal values. Id.; see also McDougal, supra note 49,
at 65. See generally McDougal, Legal Bases for Securing the Integrity of the Earth-Space
Enviroznient, 184 ANNALS N.Y. AcAD. Sci. 375, 380 (1971); McDougal & Lasswell, The
Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 1 (1959);
Nagan, Civil Process and Power: Thoughts from a Policy-OrientedPerspective, 39 U. FLA. L.
REV. 453 (1987); Reisman, A Theory About Law from the Policy Perspective, in LAW & POLICY
75 (Weisstub ed. 1976).
129. Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 113, at 496.
130. See L. CHEN, supra note 33, at 15.
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1. The Contextual Basis
NHS places the law into a dynamic state in which law is viewed
in the context of "relevant societal, community and decisional variables.'' 11 Within this scheme, secondary authority serves as a conduit
of communication for scholars. That communication provides com31 2
prehensive discussion of the variables that interact and shape law.
2.

The Problem-Solving Basis

NHS is problem solving to the extent that law is viewed as an
instrument of policy that clarifies present goal values without solely
presenting a restatement of the past.' Instead of merely reviewing
the past, NHS involves identifying past trends, analyzing the factors
affecting those trends, and considering the various alternatives.aI For
example, secondary authority, especially in the form of empirical
studies, can identify past trends and thus provide helpful guidance to
courts. For instance, in Hovey v. Superior Court,1" the California
Supreme Court included in their opinion approximately two dozen
studies that compared murder conviction rates by jurors who opposed
the death penalty to conviction rates by jurors not opposed to the
death penalty. 3 6 Thus, the Hovey court's decisionmaking was illuminated by past trends.
Yet, courts cannot consider only past trends. Courts must identify
"factors" affecting past trends to give meaning to decisionmaking and
to guide the projection of future trends. 137 The United States Supreme
Court's use of scholarly commentary to identify the economic factors
affecting the trends in antitrust decisions exemplifies the contributions
of secondary authority to this aspect of problem solving."'
Finally, problem-solving requires courts to consider possible alter9 Courts
native decisions with regard to the various trends and factors. 13

131. Id.
132. See id.
133. See id.; see also Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 113, at 500-01.
134. See L. CHEN, supra note 33, at 15.
135. 28 Cal. 3d 1, 616 P.2d 1301, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980).
136. Id. at 23, 616 P.2d at 1314, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 141. The court concluded, as a result
of the studies, that a juror who was opposed to the death penalty could still
decide on guilt
but would be removed at the sentencing portion of decision. Id. at 68-69, 616 P.2d at 1346-47,
168 Cal. Rptr. at 173-74.
137. McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, Theories About International Law: Prologue to a
Configurative Jurisprudence,8 VA. J. INT'L L. 188, 197 (1968).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 98-104.
139. See McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 137, at 197.
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can better maximize goal values by testing alternative solutions. NHS
recognizes secondary authority as an appropriate tool to explore the
various alternative solutions. The disagreement among scholars and
the expression of various opinions and solutions from differing perspectives provide the decisionmaker with a valuable testing ground. Secondary authority need not provide one solution; rather, by exposing
many alternatives, secondary authority allows the court to make a
comprehensive and effective decision, thereby maximizing goal values.
3.

The Multimethod Basis

NHS is a multimethod jurisprudence because it advocates the use
of various intellectual problem-solving skills not in a prescribed linear
order, but in a "configurative140 or matrix-like manner. At first, the
"configurative map" may appear too complex to be practical. However,
the matrix nature of the map provides NHS with the sophistication
needed to explain the complexity of the decisionmaking process.
C.

The New Haven School Configurative Map

The NHS configurative map is like a mathematical matrix. Its
components form an array allowing the components to interact with
each other. As a result, a particular linear flow does not exist. The
observer, or a person detached from the process under scrutiny, 41
views the entire process as interrelated segments of inquiry. However,
while NHS does not require a specific order of inquiry, certain ordered
functions are essential. First, the observer must establish an observational standpoint. Second, he or she should formulate problems in
terms of the allocation of society's demanded values. Third, the observer must delimit the inquiry's focus. Fourth, the observer must
explicitly postulate the public order value goals. Finally, the observer
must perform the necessary intellectual tasks.'4
1. Establishing the Observational Standpoint
During the observation process, the observer
of the authoritative dicision and value clarification
individual perspectives and personal experiences
server's view, the observer, to observe objectively,

examines the flow
processes. 14 Since
can taint the obshould disassociate

140.

L. CHEN, supra note 33, at 15.

141.

Id.

142.
143.

Id.; McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 137, at 199.
Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 113, at 502.
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THE NHS CONFIGURATIVE MAP'"

OBSERVATIONAL STANDPOINT

PROCESS
OF CLAIM

1 4G
himself or herself as much as possible from this unique standpoint.
Secondary authority, especially law reviews, provides an invaluable
is
aid to observers seeking objectivity. Generally, law review text
and, as
objectively written, considers opposing and alternative views,
1 46
law
Using
fairness.
courts indicate, is admired for its excruciating
perspectives
identify
reviews to seek objectivity allows observers to
that cloud the view, and thus observers are able to view more the
decisionmaking process accurately.

THE
144. Reisman, Myres S. McDougal, in 18 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
SOCIAL SCIENCES 479, 482 (1980).
that when the decision145. See id. For example, Professors McDougal and Lasswell indicate
on the other
observer,
The
power.
in
interested
is
maker makes choices, he or she primarily
Id.
hand, is concerned more with enlightenment.
(1953).
146. Fuld, A Judge Looks at the Law Reiew, 28 N.Y.U. L. REV. 915, 918
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2.

Formulating Problems

Problem formulation involves the disparity between what people
want, or their demanded values, and what people actually receive,
their allocated values. 147 The community process is the process in which
demanded values are allocated within a defined community. Decisionmaking is actually a process of power allocation in a community in
which the decisionmaker allocates demanded values to some at the
expense of others. 148 In the community process, various institutions
communicate value demands interactively and configuratively rather
than linearly. Jurisprudential inquiry suffers when it limits itself to a
linear analysis. For example, positivism is linear because it describes
law as traversing a single line from the leaders to the led without
considering factors beyond the linear descent of the law.14 However,
the judicial decisionmaker must add desired values that affect decisionmaking to the model to make the model complete.
The goal of the NHS paradigm is to model a decisionmaking process
that maximizes the allocation of desired values."5° NHS recognizes
eight values, or preferred events, that encompass societal demands:
Respect: Freedom of choice, equality, and recognition;
Power: Making and influencing community decisions;
Enlightenment: Gathering, processing, and disseminating information and knowledge;
Well-being: Safety, health, and comfort;
Wealth: Production, distribution, consumption of goods and
services, and control of resources;
Skill: Acquisition and exercise of capabilities in vocations,
professions, and the arts;
Affection: Intimacy, friendship, loyalty, and positive sentiments;
Rectitude: Participation in forming and applying norms of
responsible conduct.'5 '
Significant differences exist between choice advocated in NHS and
coercion expounded in Austinian positivism. The following chart com-

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

L. CHEN, supra note 33, at 16.
See Liicke, supra note 58 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 117-18.
See L. CHEN, supra note 33, at 16.
Id. Chen describes the aggregate of the eight values as security. Id.
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pares NHS choice with positivist coercion with respect to the eight
values encompassing societal demands.
VALUE

CHOICE

COERCION

Respect
Power
Enlightenment
Well-being
Wealth
Skill
Affection
Rectitude

Consideration
Negotiation
Education
Play
Bargaining
Artistry
Love
Moral Freedom

Obeisance
Submission
Indoctrination
Toil
Rationing
Servitude
Servility
Moral subjection 15 2

NHS recognizes that all decisionmaking involves choice. Decisionmakers do not make choices maximizing the allocation of values in a
sterile vacuum. 15 The communication of value demands to the decisionmaker enhances the objectivity of the decisionmaking process. The
desire for the communication of value demands is evident in the judicial
decisionmaking process by courts' reliance on and citation to one such
communicative vehicle, secondary authority.
3.

Delimiting the Focus of Inquiry

Because NHS delimits the focus of inquiry,'- it is more comprehensive and selective than other jurisprudential schools. 15 Law is more
than a collection of rules. Law is a continuous process of authoritative
decisionmaking, which includes what people say, do, and expect. 1 1
Decisions are not law unless they possess both authority and control. 157
Professor McDougal defined authority as "the participation in decision
in accordance with community perspectives about who is to make what

152. Law, Science, and Policy, pt. II, ch. 2, at 32 (1954) (unpublished class materials)
(available from the FloridaLaw Review).
153. J. STONE, supra note 9, at 61. Professor Stone discussed the "leeways of choice" in
which courts do not base their decisions solely on logic, law, or language. Id.
154. Professor Chen defined the process of delimiting the focus of inquiry as the following:
"In delimiting the focus of inquiry, the policy-oriented approach seeks to be both comprehensive
and selective. It establishes a focus on authoritative decisions in their context, placing dual
emphasis on the conception of law to be deployed and the larger context to be studied." L.
CHEN, supra note 33, at 17.

155.

Id.

156. Id.; see also Lasswell & McDougal, Criteriafor a Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L.
REV. 362, 374 (1971).
157. See infra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
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decisions with what criteria.'
Control is "effective participation in
[decisionmaking] and execution."' 159 When decisionmaking combines authority and control, the decisionmaker (the who) and the decision (the
what)are in concert with community expectations. - Secondary authority provides the medium through which these expectations are communicated in the judicial decisionmaldng process. For example, secondary authority criticizing Schwinn influenced the Court when it decided
Sylvania.161 In overruling Schwinn, the Sylvania Court aligned itself
with community expectations associated with antitrust philosophy.' 62
A decisionmaking process that is authoritative and controlling employs seven decisionmaking functions.'63 The seven functions include
the following:
Intelligence: Gathering, processing, and disseminating information essential to decisionmaking;
Promoting: Advocating general policies and urging propos-

als;
Prescribing:Projecting authoritative community policies regarding the shaping and sharing of values;
Invoking: Provisionally characterizing events in terms of
community prescriptions;
Applying: Final characterizing and executing of prescriptions
in concrete situations;
Terminating: Ending a prescription or arrangement within
the scope of a prescription;
Appraising: Evaluating performance in decision process in
terms of community goals.'r
Sylvania may be used to illustrate the role of secondary authority
in defining decision functions. The intelligence function for the Sylvania Court involved gathering of information from several sources.

158. Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 156, at 384.
159. Id. Professor McDougal further defined control by stating that "choice in outcome is
realized in significant degree in practice." Id. "When decisions are authoritative but not controlling, they are not law but pretense; when decisions are controlling but not authoritative, they

are not law but naked power." Id.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See supra text accompanying note 109.
See supra text accompanying notes 98-104.
See id.
See McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 137, at 192.
L. CHEN, supra note 33, at 18.
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The Court obtained information from applicable precedent including
Schwinn,'- case law consistent with Schwinn,16 and case law inconsistent with Schwinn.6 7 Significantly, the Court also obtained persuasive
information from scholarly criticism of Schwinn.'rs
The promoting function of secondary authority also is equally evident in the Court's reliance on secondary authority that advocated
overruling Schwinn. 69 The Sylvania Court noted that "one commentator has observed, many courts 'have struggled to distinguish or limit
Schwinn in ways that are a tribute to judicial ingenuity. ' 70 The
Court's acknowledgement of this scholarly observation evidences that
the promoting function of secondary authority affects even the highest
levels of judicial decisionmaking.
The prescribing function of secondary authority in Sylvania is unmistakable. Secondary authority communicated community policies regarding the distribution of wealth and power values, the very function
of antitrust law. This prescribing function of secondary authority, as
1
well as case law, has shaped antitrust goals. 1
The invoking function is the process by which prescriptions are
communicated to a decisionmaker with the authority to apply the
prescription. 7 2 The invoking function of secondary authority in Sylvania required the occurrence of two events. First, the author of the
secondary authority commenced the invoking function by articulating
the desired prescription. Second, the secondary authority was communicated to the Sylvania Court. Both events were required for sec-

165. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 37 (1977) (citing United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)).
166. See id. at 42 (citing Salco Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 517 F.2d 567 (10th Cir.
1975); Kaiser v. General Motors Corp., 396 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1975), affd, 530 F.2d 964
(3d Cir. 1976)).
167. See id. at 47 (citing White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963)). The
Sixth Circuit had continued to evaluate territorial restrictions under rule of reason analysis
even after White Motor Co. had called for per se analysis. See Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d
847, 849 (6th Cir. 1964).
168. See supra note 103.
169. Nine sources of secondary authority advocated the overruling of Schwinn, while only
two such sources recommended that the Court maintain the Schwinn precedent. Sylvania, 433
U.S. at 47 n.13.
170. Id. at 48 n.14 (citing Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments: 1974, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 243, 272 (1975)).
171. See generally E. SULLIVAN & J. HARRISON, supra note 102, at 1-7. Policy considerations have shifted from protecting the competitor to protecting competition. As Professor
Harrison stated, "antitrust laws [have] a certain de ja vu [sic] quality." Id. at 2.
172. L. CHEN, supra note 33, at 370.
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ondary authority to mobilize the enactment of the desired prescription.t3
The applying function is the "culmination of all other functions7 4
and the enactment of the desired prescription. Here, the role of secondary authority is minimal. Only the decisionmaker, the Sylvania
Court, assumes the applying function. At this stage, the role of secondary authority is complete until commentary evaluates the applied prescription. If the prescription of the Sylvania Court does not accomplish
desired goals, or the goals change, secondary authority then becomes
relevant to the terminating function.
The terminating function calls for the end to outmoded prescriptions. 17 Secondary authority considered by the Sylvania Court called
for an end to the Schwinn prescriptions. 176 Because this secondary
authority advocated that the Sylvania Court adopt prescriptions that
replaced the Schwinn prescriptions, the invoking and terminating functions were combined in the Sylvania case.
The appraisal function evaluates the effectiveness of the entire
process to attain desired goals.'7 The appraisal function is one of
secondary authority's major contributions to judicial decisionmaking.
After a court adopts and applies a particular prescription, secondary
authority communicates to the decisionmakers whether the prescription indeed adequately has embodied the community's expectations.
For example, secondary authority communicated to the Sylvania
Court that Schwinn's prescription did not reflect community policy
expectations.'78 As a result, the Sylvania Court overruled SchwinnY19
4. Postulating Public Order Goals
NHS posits that decisionmaking cannot avoid policy choices and
the consequences of those choices.1° Policies that maximize the distribution of cherished values are the desired goals of the NHS jurisprudential paradigm. 181 The scholarly discourse found in secondary author-

173.

See id.

174.

Id. at 376.

175. M. McDouGAL & W. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 106 (1981).
176. See supra text accompanying note 103.
177. L. CHEN, supra note 33, at 393.
178. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
180. L. CHEN, supra note 33, at 19.
181. Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 156, at 373-74.
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ity contributes to this goal by providing in-depth analysis, discussion
of competing theories, and prescriptions designed to maximize
cherished values. Unlike the biased presentation of the litigants, secondary authority distinguishes itself as being objective, reliable, and
1
fair. 8
5. Performing Intellectual Tasks
The NHS jurisprudential paradigm presents five intellectual tasks
for problem solving. As noted earlier, 1 3 the five tasks include the
following: clarifying goals, describing past trends, analyzing factors
affecting decision, projecting future trends, and inventing and evaluating policy alternatives.'4
Goal clarification:Postulation of goals for empirical observation and analysis in particular social contexts;
Past trends: Systematic inquiry of past trends viewed under
clarified goals and the constitutive process;
Factors:Identification of the factors that interplay and affect
prior decision;
Future trends: Projecting future probabilities with all available knowledge and information;
Alternatives: Creation of alternatives to maximize optimum
gains at minimum costs.""
The five intellectual tasks are indispensable tools of rationality for
the observer. The intellectual tasks allow the observer to project systematically the judicial decisionmaking process and to appraise the
importance of secondary authority in that process. Significantly, by
using the five intellectual tasks, the observer assumes a scientific
point-of-view. Thus, he or she remains detached from the judicial
decisionmaking process and can observe objectively and most accurately the conditions and consequences of the process. 1 8

182.
183.
184.
185.
tually in
186.

See supra text accompanying note 145.
See supra text accompanying notes 133-39.
L. CHEN, supra note 33, at 20.
Id. at 21 (it 'iscrucial that all of these tasks be performed systematically and contexrelation to specific problems.").
Discussion with Professor Winston P. Nagan (Feb. 28, 1990).
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D. Phase Analysis
The final segment of NHS is "phase analysis," which adds power
and policy to the jurisprudential paradigm. 1' Phase analysis occurs
when the decisionmaker's choice has allocated desired value goals. 1'
Phase analysis requires the decisionmaker to ask seven questions before, during, and after the decisionmaking process. s9 The seven questions include the following: (1) Who were the participantsof the decision? (2) What were the significant perspectives of the participants?
(3) What were the situations under which the participants interacted?
(4)What were the bases of power of the participants? (5) With what
strategies did the participants manipulate their bases of power? (6)
What were the outcomes as a result of the decision? and (7) What are
the effects of the outcome and process?'9 This note briefly will examine
phase analysis using secondary authority as a participant in the judicial
decisionmaking process.
1. Participants
When secondary authority is a participant in the judicial decisionmaking process, the identities of the author and other judicial participants, such as the bench and bar, are important to phase analysis.
A comparison of two divergent works of secondary authority illustrates
that the author's identity can influence the decision. If two commentaries address the same aspect of international law, but Professor
McDougal authors one and a high school junior authors the other,
Professor McDougal's commentary reasonably will be more influential.
The influence of secondary authority also will depend upon the
identities of the advocates. These judicial participants may or may
not decide to use secondary authority. 191 If advocates fail to cite secondary authority in a brief, motion, or memorandum, the court may
never realize secondary authority as a participant.192 Ultimately, the

187.
188.

McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 137, at 198.
Id. Professor McDougal described the distribution of value goals as "choices enforced

by sanctions and deprivations or indulgence." Id.
189. Id. The decision may be organized or unorganized. It may be a formal contract, a
fight, a vote, or a mandatory command. Id.
190. Id. In question four, Professor McDougal referred to base "values" rather than bases
of 'power." He was referring to power, and he later used the term. See, e.g., M. McDouGAL
& W. REISMAN, supra note 175, at 102.
191. Empirical studies have indicated the degree of preference of secondary citation by
particular judges. Merryman, supra note 18, at 666-67.
192. This analysis presumes that the court is not aware of a particular work and would not

otherwise discover it.
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decisionmaker must decide whether to use secondary authority and
whether actually to cite it as a source of authority.
2. Perspectives
Perspectives are the demands, identifications, and expectations as
viewed by the participants. 193 Whether or not participants will use
secondary authority is connected intimately to their perspectives. The
influence of secondary authority depends upon the position it takes,
the perspective of the judge who will decide its influence, and the
advocate who will select it.
3. Situations
Sylvania was a situation in which the Court was receptive to
recommendations from the "great weight of scholarly opinion."' 1
Another situation in which the influence of secondary authority can
be great is when the case at bar is one of "first impression. 195 If
secondary authority already has discussed the issue exhaustively, and
precedent does not exist, then this "first impression" situation is conducive to the influence of secondary authority. Yet, situations do exist
in which the influence may be minimal. For example, if an unknown
author advocates a position opposing a well-settled doctrine and if the
particular court's perspective is not aligned with the author's position,
the secondary authority probably will not be influential.
4. Bases of Power

Bases of power may be "described in terms of resources, people,
and authority.' 1 96 The base of power of secondary authority is minimal.

Although authoritative and well-reasoned, secondary authority will
not influence a court if the court is not receptive. Courts are the
power brokers in these situations. As Professor McDougal originally
noted, however, other "values" may enhance the influence of secondary
authority.'7 Although secondary authority lacks power as a participant, it may have enlightenment value. Secondary authority may elucidate an issue for a court, thereby augmenting its base of power and
thus its influence.

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

L. CHEN, supra note 33, at 65.
Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 47.
For a definition of "first impression," see supra note 42.
L. CHEN, supra note 33, at 115.
See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
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5. Strategies
Strategies are how the participants manipulate the bases of power
to influence the outcome. 198 Secondary authority can effect judicial
decisionmaking in a number of ways. Because of its comprehensive
treatment of a specific topic,99 secondary authority can demonstrate
that the desired outcome is consistent with a greater depth of scholarly
consideration.2w Further, secondary authority consisting of empirical
studies can add weight to the credence of a desired outcome. 201 Finally,
judicial participants may cite many secondary authority sources to the
court to show a uniform scholarly position consistent with the desired
outcome. 2 2
6.

Outcomes

Observation of outcomes provide the value distribution resulting
from decisionmaking. 2 3 Observing secondary authority in the judicial
decisionmaking process is a two-stage process. First, the observer
must determine whether the judicial decisionmaker considered and
cited the secondary authority. Second, if the judicial decisionmaker
considered the secondary authority, the observer must determine its
influence on the reallocation of value goals. Under this methodology,
viewing the result exposes the effects of the result.
7.

Effects

The salient effect of the judicial decisionmaker's receptivity to secondary authority provides a practitioner with a guide for future use
with the particular judicial decisionmaker. However, observation of
2°
past trends is only one intellectual task involved in problem solving.
Projecting the future utility of secondary authority requires utilizing
all the intellectual tasks. 20 5 Observing the influence of secondary authority in judicial decisionmaldng does, however, point to the practical
relation between increased secondary authority citation and NHS.

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 137, at 198.
See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
See id.
See supra text accompanying notes 133-36.
See supra text accompanying note 194.
McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 137, at 198.
See supra text accompanying notes 183-86.
See id.
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The New Haven School: PracticalAspects

NHS provides the observer with a sophisticated jurisprudential
paradigm capable of attributing the appropriate degree of influence
that secondary authority may exert on judicial decisionmaking. By
observing the increased frequency of citation to secondary authority
more comprehensively, rather than relying on what Professor Chen
calls "an anecdotal treatment of isolated tidbits of doctrine and practice, ' 2° the observer is better equipped to project future trends. NHS
explains that secondary authority can, and often does, influence decisionmaking. Moreover, NHS provides a method for determining why.
Armed with a jurisprudential paradigm that approximates the complexity of the judicial decisionmaking process itself, practitioners, students, and judges can better evaluate the potential influence, utilization, and impact of secondary authority. Because judicial decisionmakers do not operate in a vacuum, the involution of decisionmaking is
reflected in the most common answer to legal questions - "it depends. ' '207 On what it depends demands complex inquiry. NHS provides
a paradigm from which the observer adequately may perceive the
depth of complexity necessary for this inquiry.
V.

CONCLUSION

Despite the binding nature of precedent under the doctrine of stare
decisis, decisionmakers face choices. Judicial decisionmaking can require more guidance than precedent is capable of providing. Often,
courts rely on secondary authority to provide this guidance. Courts
are attracted to secondary authority because it is often comprehensive,
informative, objective, and fair. As a result, courts have cited secondary authority with increased frequency in this century.
Jurisprudential schools, such as natural law, positivism, and legal
realism, do not elucidate adequately the emergence of secondary authority because they fail to address law as a process. Responding to
these inadequacies, the NHS paradigm can help an observer evaluate
the impact and influence of secondary authority on the judicial decisionmaking process. Most importantly, the NHS paradigm provides the
practical inquiry necessary to explain secondary authority's role in the
judicial decisionmaking process.
Joseph E. Brooks

206.
207.

L. CHEN, supra note 33, at 20.
Feinman & Feldman, Pedagogy and Politics, 73 GEO. L.J. 875, 885 (1985).
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